We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents' single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent an amount of decisive power, unlike the case of trees. Rules for this case can be described in terms of a subclass of such rules for trees. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78.
Introduction
We examine the problem of choosing a location on a network (i.e. graph) based on agents' preferences over such locations. For example, consider the problem of locating a public facility, such as a post office or library, on a given road network. The choice of location is to be based on the preferences of the local citizens (or of members of a government committee). While some citizens may prefer that the facility be located near their homes, others may prefer that it be located near a workplace or some other location. In any case, the preferences are to be solicited as "votes," and a location is to be determined as a result.
The above example involves a physical road network. A virtual example involves choosing a time of day for, say, a meeting for a group of people. In this case, the network is a cycle, around the face of a clock.
1 Some people may prefer to hold meetings in the morning, while others may prefer other times of day.
A choice rule is a systematic way (i.e. function) to map (elicited) preferences into locations. One could imagine many desirable properties for a choice rule to satisfy. In this paper, our objective is to characterize the class of rules that satisfy the well-known incentives property of strategy-proofness:
an agent should never be able to manipulate the choice rule by misreporting his preferences to it. We successfully characterize the class of (onto) choice rules that satisfy this condition when agents' preferences over points on a graph are "quadratic" (i.e. symmetric, single-peaked).
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The significance of the results is as follows. First, the most important part of the contribution is clearly that we provide a description of the non- 1 We thank Michael Schwarz for suggesting this example. 2 In other words, preferences over points are inversely related to distance from a most preferred point). Our results are technically stronger using this domain, being robust to the choice of domain of single-peaked preferences, as we discuss in the Conclusion. manipulable choice rules (or "voting rules") for situations in which a location must be chosen. Second, our characterization result provides a class of rules that is surprisingly related to a class of strategy-proof rules in exchange economies described by Barberà and Jackson [4] . This connection is discussed in the Conclusion.
The seminal paper in the related literature is by Moulin [17] , who characterizes the class of generalized median voter schemes (g.m.v.s.) as the only strategy-proof rules (satisfying a "peaks-only" condition) when agents have single-peaked preferences over an interval. Ching [10] shows that the peaks-only requirement is redundant. This characterization has been generalized to multi-dimensional frameworks by various authors. Border and Jordan [9] restrict multi-dimensional preferences over Euclidean space to be separable and quadratic, and show that a strategy-proof rule must behave like a g.m.v.s. on each dimension. Barberà, Massó, and Serizawa [6] extend that result to full-dimensional subsets of Euclidean space, and show the same conclusion; furthermore, they describe which g.m.v.s.'s are actually feasible for a given subset. 3 For a much larger class of preferences, Zhou [24] provides an impossibility result for full-dimensional outcome spaces. 4 In this paper, the range of a rule is the set of points on a graph. Therefore, while we are expanding upon the notion of an interval, we are not analyzing full-dimensional, convex subsets of Euclidean space. When travel is restricted to a road network, convex combinations of locations are typically not feasible.
In a sense, our setting can be seen as a combinatorial generalization of the 1-dimensional case.
In a related paper, Danilov [12] considers a similar setting of tree networks, with single-peaked preferences that are not necessarily symmetric (i.e.
defined by distance from a peak). Imposing a "peaks-only" condition, he
shows that strategy-proof rules can be recursively decomposed into medians of constant and dictatorial rules. This result is related to the first half of this paper, in which we provide a closed-form characterization of such rules as described below.
Other work has been done regarding single-peaked preferences on graphs.
Hansen and Thisse [15] and Demange [13] restrict attention to graphs that are trees, and derive existence results for that model concerning Condorcet winners and the core, respectively. Moulin [18] discusses welfarism on more general graphs. Ching and Thomson [11] and Vohra [23] examine fairness criteria for graphs that are trees, while Gordon and Péqueux [14] do so when the graph consists of exactly one cycle.
Our results arrive with two distinct flavors. In particular, the flavor of the result depends on whether or not the given graph contains a cycle. First, in Section 3, we discuss the case in which the graph does not contain a cycle (i.e. is a tree). We provide a complete characterization of the class of strategy-proof, onto rules. Naturally, since an interval is a special case of a tree, the result is an extension of the results of Moulin's [17] and Border and Jordan [9] , characterizing generalized median voter schemes. Our characterization describes each strategy-proof, onto rule as a family of g.m.v.s.'s that together satisfy a feasibility condition we call consistency. We call such a rule an extended median voter scheme.
Second, in Section 4, we examine the case in which the graph consists of exactly one cycle (e.g. a circle). In complete contrast to the characterization for trees, we show that in this case, only dictatorial rules are both strategyproof and onto.
Finally, in Section 5, we analyze general graphs that contain at least one cycle. For such graphs, we again provide a complete characterization. A strategy-proof, onto rule for this case is described by a blend of the previous two characterizations. First, there exists an agent who has dictatorial power on or between any cycles on the graph. However, when this agent's peak is not on or between any cycles on the graph, the rule behaves like a g.m.v.s., with the restriction that it choose a point that is closer to this agent's peak than any other point on or between cycles.
We also discuss how the rules in this last characterization can be alternatively described as a certain subclass of the set of extended median voter schemes. Therefore, the class of strategy-proof, onto rules for graphs with cycles can be thought of as a subclass of such rules for trees.
The Model
There is a set of agents, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, with arbitrary agents denoted i, j, etc. There is a "road network" represented by a graph, G, formalized below.
A point (location) is to be chosen on G, based on the agents' preferences over points on G.
that is composed of the union of a finite number of (closed) curves of finite length. A path between two points on the graph, x, y ∈ G, is a minimal connected subset of G that contains x and y. Since a path is a curve, it has a well-defined length. The distance between any two points x, y ∈ G, denoted d(x, y), is the minimum path-length between the two points. Denote the set of minimallength paths between x and y by [
Typically, [x, y] is a single path. 5 For a more complete formalization of graphs and the lengths of curves, see Berge [8] , especially p. 102. 6 One exception would be if G is a circle with a circumference of 2, and d(x, y) = 1.
A cycle in G is the union of two paths in G whose intersection is equal to the set of both of their endpoints. As a distance normalization, we assume that for any graph with cycles, the distance around each cycle is at least 1, 
We are interested in onto rules that are also non-manipulable in the sense of being strategy-proof :
A standard result in the strategy-proofness literature states that any strategy-proof, onto rule satisfies what is known as unanimity:
The proof is straightforward, and left to the reader (e.g., see Barberà and Peleg [7] 
close to f (p), it follows from strategy-proofness that x = f (p), regardless of the values of p −i .
Since a strategy-proof, onto rule must satisfy unanimity, this result can be used to show our second result: The point chosen by the rule must lie "between" the agents' peaks, in the sense that the shortest paths from the agents' peaks to the chosen point must jointly intersect only at the chosen point.
Lemma 2 (no intersecting shortest paths) Let f be a strategy-proof
The next lemma states that when all agents' peaks lie in a sufficiently small neighborhood, a strategy-proof, onto rule chooses an efficient point-a point lying in the union of the shortest paths between peaks. Recall that distance has been normalized so that the length of each cycle (if one exists)
is at least 1.
Lemma 3 (limited efficiency) Let f be a strategy-proof rule for a graph
Proof: Suppose in contradiction to the Lemma that
Claim:
As the minimum length of a cycle is 1, we have
(or both). In the former case, the triangle
, and the Claim is proven.
Repeating the argument, by Lemma 2, there must exist
By the Claim, we have 
Rules for Trees
In this section, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules for trees.
This characterization is, naturally, a generalization of Border and Jordan's [9] characterization of such rules on lines. A technical detail is the fact that when talking about one dimension, Border and Jordan deal with the real line, while we deal with finite intervals. It can be shown, though, that their results also hold on intervals. 7 In terms of our model, Border and Jordan show that if a graph G consists of a single edge (i.e., is a single curve), then each strategy-proof, onto rule is a generalized median voter scheme (g.m.v.s.)
as introduced by Moulin [17] and defined below.
For any x, y ∈ G, consider the restriction of a strategy-proof, onto rule f 
Proposition 1 (Border and Jordan [9] ) Suppose G contains exactly two vertices, so G = [x, y], and let f be a strategy-proof, onto rule for
Condition (2) 
In other words, in the original statement of the Proposition, x is "left" and y is "right." However, this choice was arbitrary. The important observation for our purposes is that there is a relationship between these two sets of parameters.
Suppose the two sets of parameters {α Proposition 2 shows that we can describe the behavior of strategy-proof, onto rules on any single path of a tree. For the remainder of this section, for a given tree G, rule f , and points x, y ∈ G, the parameters {α xy S } S⊂N are understood to be those described in Proposition 2.
Even though strategy-proof, onto rules behave like g.m.v.s.'s when restricted to paths, one cannot begin to construct a strategy-proof, onto rule for trees by arbitrarily choosing a g.m.v.s. for each path on the tree. The critical issue is that for any two paths that intersect on an interval, the two corresponding g.m.v.s.'s on those two paths must not contradict each other satisfied. In Figure 1c , it is not. 
A Characterization
and, without loss of generality, We show that [a (ii) for all p ∈ G, f (p) is the unique point a such that for all x, y ∈ L, Our characterization result for trees is the following result. Let p ∈ G n be such that i ∈ S implies p i = b, and i ∈ S implies p i = a.
By the definition of an onto g.m.v.s., we have f | wz (p wz ) = b. Similarly, we have f | xy (p xy ) = a, which is a contradiction.
Step 2. We show that f is an e.m.v.s.
Since {f | xy } x,y∈L is a consistent family of g.m.v.s.'s, Proposition 3 implies that for all p ∈ G n , there exists a unique point, g(p), such that for all x, y ∈ L,
. We need to show that f = g.
Suppose not. Then, for some p ∈ G n and some x, y ∈ L, we have Figure 4b . Let be sufficiently small so as to satisfy the conditions of Lemma 1 (i.e., in the notation of that
By Lemma 1 (or simply by strategy-proofness),
well-defined. Furthermore, we have shown
. Therefore, by the definition of a g.m.v.s. (in particular, the uncompromisingness property, in the sense of Border and Jordan [9] 
contradicting eqn. (4).
Therefore a strategy-proof, onto rule must be an e.m.v.s.
Proving that an e.m.v.s. is both strategy-proof and onto is straightforward, and is left to the reader.
Rules for a Single Cycle
In this section, we consider the case in which the graph G consists of a single cycle. More generally, for graphs that contain a cycle, we describe the behavior of the restriction of a strategy-proof, onto rule to a single cycle. We
show that the restriction of such a rule to a cycle is dictatorial.
The reasoning behind the proof is as follows. First, along "short" paths on G, a strategy-proof, onto rule must behave like a generalized median voter scheme. This is completely analogous to Proposition 2 above, and is stated below as Proposition 4.
Consider a cycle C ⊂ G. This cycle is composed of the union of many overlapping, "short" paths. Each pair of g.m.v.s.'s for these paths must be consistent. As we show in the proof of Theorem 2, the cyclic structure implies that each such g.m.v.s. must be dictatorial. In fact, this notion is used to prove a stronger statement in Theorem 2, concluding this section: there must be a dictator on the entire cycle.
The following result is analogous to Proposition 2 for trees, so we omit the proof. To present the next set of results, we refer to the parameters, {α xy S } S⊆N , described in Proposition 4. The following lemma states that whenever [x, y] lies within a cycle, these parameters lie at the extreme points of the interval.
Furthermore, for each coalition, and for any pair of intervals, [x, y] and [w, z],
that lie on the same cycle, the direction in which its parameter lies (i.e., the "right" or "left" of the interval) is consistent across the two intervals. In essence, this implies that on intervals of length less than 1/8 within a given cycle, a strategy-proof, onto rule can be described in terms of right-and left-coalitions.
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To be precise, we need to introduce notation to refer to direction around a cycle (e.g. clockwise vs. counter-clockwise). For any cycle C ⊂ G, we call the "clockwise" operator. To avoid a tedious description of an intuitively simple operator, we informally define it as follows. Imagine fixing a (clockwise) direction on the cycle; there are two choices of direction, and the choice is arbitrary. For all x, y ∈ C such that d(x, y) ≤ 1/8, we say x y if x lies beyond y in a clockwise direction. For example, on a clock, 4: 00 3: 00;
1: 00 12: 00; 3: 00 and 9: 00 are not comparable because the distance between them is greater than 1/8 (since the distance around a cycle is at least 1). 
Lemma 4 (right-/left-coalitions)
Repeating the arguments that lead to eqns. (5) and (6) If instead we had α = y, then we would have shown that S is a "leftcoalition."
The next lemma states that the restriction of a strategy-proof, onto rule to a cycle always selects an agent's peak.
Lemma 5 (peak selection) Suppose G contains a cycle C ⊂ G, and let f be a strategy-proof, onto rule for G.
and
Similarly, there exists
Repeating the construction for the other agents, we have
Lemma 4.
Now we have our main result for the case of three agents.
Proposition 5 Suppose G contains a cycle C ⊂ G, and let f be a strategyproof, onto rule for G. If |N | = 3, then there exists i ∈ N such that for all
Assume without loss of generality (and by Lemma 5) that f (p) = p 1 . We
Let S be the set of coalitions described in Lemma 4. Note that by Proposition 4, it is sufficient to show that both (i) {1} ∈ S and (ii) if S ∈ S and |S| = 1, then S = {1}. 10 Notice also that if S ∈ S, then S ⊂ S ⊂ N implies S ∈ S. 10 These two conditions are what define a dictator for our class of median voter schemes. Figure 5a) . By Proposition 4, we have {3} ∈ S.
, and Figure 5b ). 
Proof: The proof is by induction on n = |N |. Our method of proof requires having shown the result for the case n = 3, which was done in Proposition 5.
Proving the result for the case n = 2 is similar to the proof of Proposition 5,  and is left to the reader.
Suppose that the result is true for n agents. We show that the result holds for n + 1 agents.
Let f : C n+1 → C be a strategy-proof, onto rule. Define two n-agent rules, g and g , as follows:
That is, g is defined by creating a "copy" of agent n, placing that copy in the n + 1st position, and applying the rule f . Similarly, g is defined by duplicating agent 1.
Step 1: g and g are both strategy-proof and onto.
Since a strategy-proof, onto rule must satisfy unanimity, it follows that g is onto. It is also clear that agents 1 through n − 1 cannot manipulate the rule g. Thus, to demonstrate the strategy-proofness of g it suffices to prove that for all p ∈ C n and all
By the strategy-proofness of f , for all p ∈ C n and all p n ∈ C,
Hence g is strategy-proof.
Similarly, g is strategy-proof and onto.
Step 2: if i < n is a cycle-dictator for g, then i is a cycle-dictator for f .
By the induction hypothesis above, there exists i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
Let p ∈ C n+1 . For all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} with j = i, let p j = f (p), and let 
Step 3: if i > 1 is a cycle-dictator for g , then i + 1 is a cycle-dictator for f .
This follows as in Step 2.
Step 4:
. . , p n+1 ). Therefore it cannot be that both g(p 1 , . . . , p n ) = p n and
Therefore either Step 2 or
Step 3 applies, and f is dictatorial on C.
Rules for Graphs with Cycles
Consider the case in which G consists of a cycle and a line segment intersecting the cycle at one of its endpoints (as in Figure 6 ). Clearly a dictatorial rule on G is both strategy-proof and onto. A non-dictatorial, strategy-proof, onto rule also exists for this graph. One such rule can be constructed as follows: for each profile of preferences, if at least one agent's peak lies on the cycle, choose the point on the cycle closest to agent 1's peak; otherwise, choose the peak of the agent closest to the cycle.
For this rule, agent 1 plays the role of "cycle dictator" from Theorem 2.
On the line segment, the rule behaves just like a (non-dictatorial ) generalized median voter scheme. However, this generalized median voter scheme has the additional feature that from the perspective of agent 1, the chosen location (on the line segment) is at least as good as any location on the cycle. In fact, this notion-that the cycle dictator likes the chosen location as much as any location on a cycle-is what helps to characterize the strategy-proof, onto rules for graphs.
Before we complete this characterization, we generalize Theorem 2 to more general cyclic subsets of graphs. We have shown that on any given cycle, a strategy-proof, onto rule must be dictatorial. This result extends to certain connected sets of cycles.
The following lemma says that each of the "cycle dictators" described by Theorem 2 (for each of the different cycles on the graph) are the same agent, i.e. there is one agent such that whenever all peaks are on the same cycle, that agent's peak is chosen.
Lemma 6 (unique cycle dictator) Suppose C, C ⊂ G are two cycles, and let f be a strategy-proof, onto rule for G. There exists an agent
Proof: Without loss of generality, we will assume that C and C can be connected by a path whose interior intersects no cycles. If the conclusion of the Lemma holds for this case, then the conclusion holds in the general case by repeating the argument.
Therefore, describe a path connecting C and C by letting x ∈ C, x ∈ C be such that for any cycle
By Theorem 2, there exist i, j ∈ N such that for all p ∈ C n and all
By Proposition 4, the restriction of f to [x k , x k+1 ] n must be a generalized median voter scheme for each k. For each k, let (α
) S⊆N be the parameters for the rule in which we (arbitrarily) set the partial order to satisfy
which implies that for all S ⊂ N such that i ∈ S, α The following lemma states that the unique cycle dictator described in Lemma 6 is a dictator over the minimal connected subgraph containing all cycles in the graph. We will refer to this (unique) minimal subgraph as the cycles neighborhood. In Figure 7 , the cycles neighborhood consists of the part of the graph drawn with thick lines plus everything lying to the right of C .
Lemma 7 (cycles neighborhood dictator) Suppose that G contains at least one cycle. Let C ⊆ G be the minimal connected subgraph of G containing all of the cycles in G (i.e., the cycles neighborhood of G).
There
Proof: Let p ∈ C. Let i ∈ N be the cycles dictator described in Lemma 6.
Note that Lemma 2 implies that f (p) ∈ C. If f (p) = p i , we are done.
Otherwise, for all j = i, let p j = f (p). By repeated application of strategy-
By Lemma 1, for all p i sufficiently close to f (p), we have f (p ) = f (p).
Suppose there exists such a p i not equal to f (p) which lies on a cycle also containing f (p). Then by Lemma 6, we have f (p ) = p i , contradicting Lemma 1. Our first main result of this section is that a strategy-proof, onto rule must choose a location along the unique path between the cycle dictator's peak and the cycles neighborhood. Therefore, whenever the cycle-dictator's peak lies in the cycle-neighborhood, (and, hence, when this path is a point,) that agent's peak is chosen. All of our characterizations for graphs with cycles are based upon this result.
Theorem 3 (cycle dictator's rationality) Suppose that G contains at least one cycle. Let C ⊆ G be the cycles neighborhood of G. There exists
Proof: Let i ∈ N be the cycle dictator described in Lemma 7. Without loss of generality, assume that for all j = i, p j = f (p) (as in the proof of Lemma 7). By Lemma 1, for 
If f (p) ∈ C, then an argument similar to the one in the proof of Lemma 6
can be used, along a path from
for all x ∈ C.
A Characterization
Reconsider the example of a graph given in Figure 6 . According to Theorem 3, under any strategy-proof, onto rule, there exists an agent, say agent 1, such that for any profile of preferences, (i) if agent 1's peak is on the cycle, his peak is chosen, and (ii) otherwise, the chosen location must lie on the interval between his peak and the cycle.
Conversely, the following method will always produce a strategy-proof, onto rule for this graph: (i) if agent 1's peak is on the cycle, choose his peak, and (ii) otherwise, on the line segment, use an onto generalized median voter scheme that always chooses a point between agent 1's peak and the point on the line segment intersecting the cycle. 11 Given Border and Jordan's [9] characterization of generalized median voter schemes as the only strategyproof rules for symmetric, single peaked preferences on a line segment, this method can be shown to provide the only way to construct strategy-proof, onto rules for this particular graph.
For more general graphs with cycles, a similar characterization holds, as we formalize below. That is, for any such graph, each strategy-proof, onto rule can be constructed by choosing an agent, say agent 1, such that (i) if agent 1's peak lies on the cycles neighborhood, choose his peak, and
(ii) otherwise, if agent 1's peak lies on some "subtree," use any strategyproof, onto rule for trees, specific to that subtree, that always chooses a point between agent 1's peak and the unique intersection of that subtree with the cycles neighborhood. In the second case (ii), we rely on the characterization 11 The arguments of the generalized median voter scheme are the points on the line segments closest to the agents' peaks on the graph-their "peaks" on the line segment. results for trees from Section 3.1.
Our description of strategy-proof rules therefore depends on labeling the "subtrees" which, together with the cycles neighborhood, make up G. Let Our main characterization result for graphs with cycles is based on the ideas and results mentioned above, and can be roughly described as follows. First, by Theorem 3, the chosen location must lie between a prespecified agent's peak and the cycles neighborhood. Second, the restriction of a strategy-proof rule to a maximal tree of G must itself be a strategy-proof rule defined on that maximal tree. Therefore, by 
Proof: Follows from Theorems 1 and 3.
It is interesting to observe that the class of rules described in Theorem 
Conclusion

Summary
We have derived a characterization of the class of strategy-proof, onto rules that choose locations on networks (graphs), when agents' preferences over points on the graph are inversely related to distance from a most-preferred point on the graph (i.e., symmetric, single-peaked preferences). The flavor of the results depend on whether the graph contains a cycle. When the graph is a tree (no cycles), we describe the class of strategy-proof, onto rules as extended median voter schemes. This class of rules is, necessarily, a generalization of the class of generalized median voter schemes for an interval, described by Moulin [17] . However, the generalization is not straightforward in the sense that (i) it relies on a type of consistency as described in Section 3, and (ii) given consistent g.m.v.s.'s, when peaks do not lie on a single path, there is only one way to choose a location in a strategy-proof way.
When the graph contains at least one cycle, the class of strategy-proof, onto rules is more restricted. On the part of the graph containing cycles (i.e., the "cycles neighborhood"), one agent must exercise dictatorial power.
On the other parts of the graph, though, this agent's power is diminished:
there is some flexibility in the choice of a point between this agent's most preferred location and the cycles neighborhood. We in fact show that the class of rules for cyclic graphs is in a sense isomorphic to a subclass of the extended median voter schemes.
The results for cyclic graphs are partially negative and partially positive; one agent acts as a dictator on or between all cycles on the network, but exercises more limited power on other parts of the network. If the network is thought of as representing a highway network, with cycles around an urban center, and subtrees branching out into the suburbs, the rules can be, very roughly, described as follows: A given agent either chooses an exact location within the urban area or chooses a suburb in which the location should lie; then if a suburb was chosen, the remaining agents choose the exact location within the suburb (according to a generalized median voter scheme particular to that suburb).
Comments
There are two important issues upon which we comment: the choice of domain, and a connection to strategy-proofness results on other domains.
The results in this paper are based on the domain of single-peaked preferences that are quadratic. That is, preferences depend only on distance from the peak. Our result for trees can be used to show that the characterization of e.m.v.s.'s also holds on the (larger) domain of non-symmetric, single-peaked preferences, i.e., preferences that merely satisfy the condition that if p is an agent's most preferred point, then a ∈ [b, p] implies that a is preferred to b. 13 This is the domain of preferences used, for example, by Danilov [12] and Moulin [17] . Therefore, Danilov's result provides a recursive definition of e.m.v.s.'s.
For any significantly larger class of preferences (that are not single-peaked for all agents), we are confident that an impossibility result would obtain.
This finding would be consistent with the recent work on maximal domains,
showing that on an interval, no interesting, significant superset of singlepeaked preferences can allow reasonable strategy-proof rules (e.g. see Barberà, Massó, and Neme [5] , and the papers they cite).
Our rules can, however, be extended to certain domains in which only one agents' preferences are always single-peaked. 14 An interesting example is the domain of exchange economies. In particular, Barberà and Jackson [4] characterize the class of strategy-proof rules for 2-agent, -good exchange economies as those that, essentially, allow trade only along directions from an endowment point.
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The directions must be such that one of the agents has single-peaked preferences over the entire range of the rule. The other agent then has single-peaked preferences over any one of the directions, but not necessarily single-peaked over the entire graph. Therefore, the range can be thought of as a tree with the endowment point representing a central node, and each direction of trade representing an edge from that node. Surprisingly, the 13 The proof has a standard style of extending strategy-proofness characterizations to larger domains (see Schummer [20] ). The extension does not require a peaks-only condition to be imposed; the condition is implied.
14 We thank an anonymous referee for this observation. 15 See their Theorem 5 for a more precise description.
strategy-proof rules characterized by Barberà and Jackson [4] are a subclass of e.m.v.s.'s.
